A reading of the main cause of the Troubles: power lost its rule of succession
In my view, the causes of the Troubles rest on one mechanism: a crisis in the legitimacy of power. The famine and the claimant struck exactly there. In the 16th century a tsar’s claim to rule rested on descent from the Rurik dynasty. In 1598 that source of legitimacy ran dry. I read these events as a theorist of the state, with a master’s degree from the law faculty of Lomonosov Moscow State University.
In February 1598 the Zemsky Sobor, an assembly of the realm’s estates, elected Boris Godunov tsar. The Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library records this in its ‘This Day in History’ section. There was a procedure, but an elected tsar with no blood tie to the old dynasty had no undisputed claim to the throne.
My study “Chronological Rhymes of Russian Statehood” explains the matching dates without any magic. The point is not the mysticism of numbers or formal numerology but the recurring mechanics of political cycles. I name three such mechanics there: a crisis of legitimacy, a search for a rule of succession and forced modernization. I place the crisis of 1605 in the first of these types.
Following Godunov’s death, the dispute was no longer about the man on the throne. In my reading, the Troubles then moved from hidden unrest to open civil war and a struggle over the very principle of supreme power. The lesson: famine, crop failure or a lost battle do not bring a state down on their own. A shock becomes dangerous when the country already argues over who has the right to rule it.
The causes of the Time of Troubles also have simple explanations: one famine, or one plot among the boyars, the landed aristocracy. I test both below, in the section on the main counterargument, and show why neither explains 15 years of collapse, from 1598 to 1613. This text is written as an analysis, and more analyses of what lies behind major events are in our Analysis section.
What happened from 1591 to 1605: a timeline with dates
The timeline covers 14 years, from May 1591 to June 1605. It runs from the death of Tsarevich Dmitry, the youngest son of Ivan the Terrible, to a mutiny in Moscow. That mutiny ended with the murder of Tsar Fyodor Godunov. The timeline below is shorter than the sections on causes and keeps the dates in front of you.
The dates come from pages of the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library in its ‘This Day in History’ section. They carry no publication date, so I name the section. Russia then used the Julian calendar, so a date such as 13 (23) April gives the Julian date first and the modern one in brackets. My manuscript (2026) gives my interpretation, not evidence for the facts.
| When | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| May 1591 | Tsarevich Dmitry died in Uglich in unclear circumstances; an inquiry led by the boyar Vasily Shuisky ruled it an accident | This Day in History |
| January 1598 | The childless Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich died, and a dynastic crisis began | This Day in History |
| February 1598 | Tsaritsa Irina refused the throne, and the Zemsky Sobor elected her brother Boris Godunov tsar | This Day in History |
| 1601–1603 | A rainy 1601, early frosts, a second failed harvest and three years of mass famine | This Day in History |
| 1603 | The revolt of the ataman Khlopko: troops crushed the rebels but did not calm the country | This Day in History |
| Early 1604 | A letter from Narva about a Dmitry saved by a miracle was intercepted; the inquiry named a runaway monk as the impostor | This Day in History |
| October 1604 | The False Dmitry set out for Moscow with a small force of Poles and Cossacks | This Day in History |
| January 1605 | Government troops beat the impostor near Sevsk, and he withdrew to Putivl | This Day in History |
| 13 (23) April 1605 | Boris Godunov died in the Kremlin in unclear circumstances; officially, of a stroke | This Day in History |
| June 1605 | A mutiny of the False Dmitry’s supporters in Moscow, the murder of Fyodor Godunov and his mother | This Day in History |
First cause: the dynasty ended, and the elected tsar never became lawful
The first cause: in February 1598, for the first time, the Zemsky Sobor, not birth, gave Russia a tsar. A month earlier the childless Fyodor Ivanovich, a son of Ivan the Terrible, had died. His widow Irina refused to be crowned and took the veil as a nun. No heir by blood was left (Presidential Library).
The Sobor elected the tsaritsa’s brother, Boris Godunov. The new rule of power lasted only 7 years, from his election to his death in April 1605. As I argue in my study, Boris’s sudden death in spring 1605 brought down a new dynasty that had not taken root.
The problem was not only the ruler. Under Godunov, in 1589, Russia elected its first patriarch, Job. In May 1595 the Peace of Tyavzino with Sweden returned Ivangorod, Yam, Koporye and Korela, the library note says. In the 1580s and 1590s, by the same account, a full land census was carried out. Government worked, yet the question of his right to the throne remained unsettled.
Doubt grew from the death of Tsarevich Dmitry, Ivan IV’s youngest son and Tsar Fyodor’s half-brother, in Uglich in May 1591. An inquiry led by the boyar Prince Vasily Shuisky concluded it was an accident. Yet people spoke of a political murder, the same source adds. As long as the rumor lived, so did hope for a “true” heir, and 13 years later a pretender used it.
Does this mean an elected tsar was doomed? No: in 1613 the same kind of assembly led the country out of the Troubles. The difference lay in what the choice rested on. Godunov was tied to the Rurik dynasty only by marriage, as the brother of Tsaritsa Irina, not by blood. Mikhail Romanov was no Rurikid either, but he was Tsar Fyodor’s blood relative. His father was the tsar’s first cousin, as the section on that assembly shows.
Second cause: a volcano in Peru, the frosts of 1601 and three years of famine
The second cause came from Peru: on 19 February 1600 the Huaynaputina volcano produced the largest eruption in the continent’s recorded history. On 11 October 2022 Eos, the news magazine of the American Geophysical Union, reported that its column rose 32 kilometers. Eos put the magma released at about 13 cubic kilometers.
The University of California, Davis, explained the mechanism in a news release of 23 April 2008. The eruption threw a lot of sulfur into the air. Sulfur and water form droplets of sulfuric acid, which cut the sunlight that reaches the ground. The droplets settle quickly, so the cooling lasts about a year, and tree rings show 1601 as a cold year.
The cold of 1601 shows up far from Russia. The university lists very cold winters in 1600–1602 in Switzerland, Latvia and Estonia. It also cites a late grape harvest in France and a collapse of wine making in Germany. In China peach trees bloomed late, and Lake Suwa in Japan froze on one of its earliest dates in 500 years.
Finland shows the scale of the crop failure. Church records of one parish say that from 142.7 barrels of rye sown in 1601, farmers harvested one barrel. A barrel held about 146.5 liters. The same Eos article cites this example from the historian Heli Huhtamaa of the University of Bern.
Sediment cores from seven fjords of Novaya Zemlya, collected by expeditions in 2015 and 2017, also hold traces of the cooling. They show a sharp drop in how fast sediment built up and fewer remains of sea organisms. The study was led by Valery Rusakov of the Vernadsky Institute of Geochemistry and Analytical Chemistry in Moscow. His team linked this cooling to crop failures in northern Europe (as summarized by Eos, 2022).
In Russia, 1601 was unusually rainy and frost came early. The next summer the harvest failed again, and mass famine lasted three years (Presidential Library). Godunov opened the royal granaries. In 1601–1602 he also briefly restored St George’s Day, the traditional autumn window for peasants to change landlords. Even then, only a new lord could move them. Tension still grew.
I start the crisis right here: the summer frosts of 1601 set off the three-year Great Famine. The same Eos article says the famine killed a third of Russia’s population. This is the magazine’s estimate with no calculation shown, and I give it as an estimate, not as an established figure.
The point of this section is that the shock came from outside and hit all of northern Europe. In Russia, though, it struck a state where the claim to the throne was already in dispute. That is why I see the famine as an accelerator of the Troubles, not their root cause.
Third cause: an impostor answered the question the assembly left open
An impostor can appear only where blood decides who is lawful and the heir’s death is in doubt. By 1604 Russia had both conditions. The famine gave him an army of the discontented, and the rumor that Ivan the Terrible’s son Dmitry had survived gave them a banner.
In early 1604 guards on the Russian-Swedish border intercepted a letter from a foreigner in Narva. It said that Dmitry had escaped by a miracle and was marching on Moscow with an army. The inquiry named a runaway monk as the impostor, according to the page on Godunov’s election. This is the finding of Godunov’s government, and I add no other theories about who the claimant was.
Discontent had been building before the famine. A decree of 1597 on “fixed years” targeted peasants who had fled their lords in the five years before it (Presidential Library). They were to be searched for, tried and returned. The famine brought unrest and riots, the largest being the revolt of the ataman Khlopko in 1603. It was crushed, but the country did not calm down.
In my view, the economic catastrophe eroded what was left of the stability of Godunov’s rule and prepared the ground for impostors. In October 1604 the False Dmitry set out for Moscow with a small force of Poles and Cossacks. People unhappy with Godunov joined him everywhere (library note on Godunov).
In January 1605 government troops crushed his army near Sevsk, but False Dmitry did not disappear; he withdrew to Putivl (same note). The tsar’s death, not the battle, decided the outcome. Boris died on 13 (23) April 1605, and his son Fyodor took the throne.
Less than two months later, in June 1605, the False Dmitry’s supporters rose up in Moscow. They killed Fyodor Godunov and his mother and spared Boris’s daughter Ksenia (library note on Godunov). The conclusion of this section: a military victory over a claimant did not settle the dispute over legitimacy. So Godunov’s son could not keep the throne.
Fourth cause: the elite split, and the neighbors moved into the vacuum

The Troubles of the early 17th century became a war between camps, not classes, and since the 1980s scholars have described the split as vertical. Ruslan Skrynnikov and Alexander Stanislavsky saw the divide between groups, not classes, writes Maureen Perrie of the University of Birmingham in a 2019 review.
The review appeared in a history journal of Volgograd State University and lists the links of this war. They start with the Khlopko revolt (1603) and the campaign and short reign of False Dmitry I (1604–1606). After them come the Bolotnikov rising (1606–1607) and the career of False Dmitry II (1607–1610). Then come the resistance to the Polish and Swedish interventions (1609–1612) and the Zarutsky episode (1611–1614).
One claimant followed another because the question of who should hold the throne was never settled. The neighbors joined this war when it was already under way. Perrie dates the resistance to their interventions to 1609–1612. Yet the wars with Sweden and Poland ended only in 1617 and 1618 (Presidential Library). They came into a war that had started, rather than starting it.
Candidates for the Moscow throne included the Swedish prince Carl Philip and the Polish prince Wladyslaw (Presidential Library). The neighbors offered their candidates because the throne was contested, not the other way around. So I do not call them the cause of the Troubles: on the facts, they took advantage of a collapse.
In my summary matrix the “fifth” years share one formula: a crisis of legitimacy, social protest or a foreign-policy blow. In 1605 all three came together: a dispute over the throne, the protest of the hungry and a claimant marching with Polish and Cossack troops. Polish and Swedish state intervention came later, from 1609. That is why the split at the top turned into a war that lasted until the Sobor of 1613.
The main counterargument: would one famine or one plot have been enough?
Neither of the two simple versions survives a check against the facts. Neither the climate nor a plot explains a war that lasted until the Sobor of 1613. I start with the climate, because its evidence is the strongest.
The authors of the climate theory set its limits themselves. In the 2008 news release, Professor Ken Verosub of UC Davis said he could not prove the volcano caused all of this. The aim of the work, he said, was to show that 1601 was a bad year everywhere and that one event linked it.
The environmental historian Andy Bruno of Northern Illinois University warned in 2022 against claims that reduce a complex historical event to one climate shock. As he put it in Eos, the eruption played a role in the Great Famine but was far from the only factor. The crop failures made a political and social conflict that was already under way worse.
There is a stronger version too. Valery Rusakov told the same magazine that the cooling led to the Great Famine of 1601–1603. That famine, he said, led in turn to a change of ruling dynasties in Russia. Even this version describes a chain, from cold to famine and from famine to a change of dynasty. The climate does not explain why the famine ended in a change of dynasty.
The timeline weakens the single-plot theory. Fyodor Godunov was killed in June 1605, and False Dmitry I ruled only briefly, until 1606 (Perrie, 2019). Yet the Troubles did not end; they lasted until Mikhail Romanov was elected in 1613. If one party’s conspiracy had been the cause, its victory would have closed the question.
My answer to the counterargument is this: the Troubles come from three conditions locking together. In the cases reviewed here, none of them caused a collapse alone. That is why my study starts with the mechanics of cycles, not the mysticism of numbers. More pieces on history and the theory of the state are in our Science and research industry.
How the Troubles ended: the assembly of 1613 built a new rule of power
The Troubles ended when the question of lawful rule got a new answer. On 21 February (3 March) 1613 the Zemsky Sobor elected Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov tsar. The Sobor first met in January 1613, after Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky had freed Moscow from Polish forces (Presidential Library). They were a merchant and a prince who led the national militia.
By the number and standing of its members, it was one of the fullest “councils of the whole land” (library note on Mikhail’s coronation). It turned down the foreign candidates and preferred a Russian Orthodox tsar. Those who had taken part in the political plots of the Troubles also had little chance. Mikhail’s candidacy was supported by the Cossacks and ordinary provincial delegates, the same note says.
The key difference from 1598 was kinship. Mikhail’s father, the boyar Fyodor Nikitich, later Patriarch Filaret, was a first cousin of Fyodor Ivanovich, the last tsar of the Rurik line. The page on his coronation gives this. The choice joined the assembly’s decision to kinship with the last lawful tsar, though Mikhail was not a Rurikid. It was the same procedure as in 1598, now backed by kinship and by a broad assembly.
Mikhail entered Moscow on 2 (12) May, the library note on his coronation says. He was crowned on 11 (21) July 1613 in the Dormition Cathedral of the Kremlin. Less than five months passed from his election to his coronation, and 15 years from the end of the old dynasty. The wars ended later, the same note says: the Treaty of Stolbovo with Sweden (1617) and the Truce of Deulino with Poland (1618).
I see the main outcome of the Troubles as a new rule of power. An assembly chooses the tsar, and the choice rests on kinship with the last lawful tsar and on a broad membership. In the first years of his reign the young tsar settled most state and foreign-policy questions together with his father (coronation page). The country’s economy slowly recovered during his reign, the same source adds.
I call 1613 the reassembly of statehood. For me, Mikhail Romanov’s election at the Zemsky Sobor is the point where the Troubles were overcome. It was a compromise between the estates, made to survive and to restore national sovereignty. The compromise worked where, in 1598, a procedure alone had not been enough.
The rhyme of the “fifth” years: what broke in 1705, 1805 and 1905
One, two and three centuries after 1605, power in Russia took a blow again. Only 1905, though, reached a dispute over the very right to rule. I see a common thread. At a century’s turn, a year ending in 5 always marks the moment when inner strain or outside failure shows how fragile the order is. That is my thesis, not a proven rule: of the four cases below, only 1605 and 1905 reached that dispute.
| Year | Blow | What broke | How power responded | Source of facts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1605 | Internal: a tsar’s death with no rooted dynasty, after three years of famine | The order of succession; civil war began | No answer until the Zemsky Sobor (1613) | Library note on Godunov |
| 1705 | Internal: new taxes and duties, a ban on Russian dress and beards | Authority in Astrakhan: the rebels elected a council and elders and abolished the taxes | Storming of the city on 13 (24) March 1706; 365 people of Astrakhan executed or died under torture | Library note on the 1705 uprising |
| 1805 | External: the defeat of the Russian and Austrian army at Austerlitz on 20 November (2 December) | The hope of acting as Europe’s easy arbiter | A rethink of the strategy toward France | Vestnik MGIMO, 2012; the response is my reading |
| 1905 | Internal and external: the land and labor questions, defeats in the Far East | The autocracy: a direct clash between society and the state | The Manifesto of 17 October and the State Duma | Text of the manifesto, Faculty of History, Moscow State University |
The columns “What broke” and “How power responded” give my reading; the facts come from the last column. In 1705 the crack ran through Peter the Great’s modernization. As I note in my study, that year brought regular military conscription and, in the same year, the Astrakhan uprising. In my reading, the revolt joined protest against the tax burden with rejection of the breaking of the traditional way of life.
On the night of 30 July (10 August) 1705, musketeers known as streltsy rose in Astrakhan. They had been exiled from Moscow after the musketeer revolt of 1698. The library’s note on the uprising names extortion as the trigger. Another was the harsh enforcement of the ban on Russian dress and beards by the governor Timofei Rzhevsky. The rebels took the citadel but failed to raise the Volga and Don regions, and two attempts to take Tsaritsyn failed.
Troops under Field Marshal Boris Sheremetev stormed Astrakhan on 13 (24) March 1706, the page on the uprising says. That was less than 8 months after the revolt began. The promised amnesty gave way to arrests.
In 1805 the blow came from outside. In that campaign Alexander I became the first Russian ruler since Peter the Great to go to war in person. He also lived through the defeat of the allied armies at Austerlitz, writes the historian Rybakov in the journal Vestnik MGIMO (2012). In my reading, the illusion of easy European arbitration then dissolved, and St Petersburg had to rethink its whole strategy toward France.
Where the rhyme is weaker, I say so plainly. The crises of 1705 and 1805 did not reach a dispute over the very principle of power. According to the source, the people of Astrakhan rose against taxes, extortion and the governor, and after Austerlitz the issue was foreign policy. The crises of 1605 and 1905 did reach that dispute, so their rhyme is the strongest.
I look at the crisis of 1905 separately in the next section. In my reading, the pent-up land and labor questions and the failures in the Far East led to a direct clash between society and autocracy.
Why the state spoke of “troubles” again in 1905
In 1905 the state itself called the crisis smuta, the same Russian word that names the Time of Troubles. The Manifesto of 17 October opens with that very word. It says that smuta and unrest in the capitals and many places of the empire fill the tsar’s heart with great and heavy sorrow. The text is published by the Faculty of History of Lomonosov Moscow State University and checked against a 1994 edition of Russian legislation (volume 9).
The manifesto warns that the unrest may bring “deep popular disorder and a threat to the integrity and unity of our state” (translated). It calls on loyal subjects to help end “this unheard-of turmoil” (translated), again with the word smuta. Nicholas II signed it on 17 (30) October 1905, and Obolensky and Vuich drafted it under the direction of Sergei Witte (Presidential Library).
As in 1613, the answer was a representative body. The manifesto promised a State Duma and set the rule “that no law could take effect without the approval of the State Duma” (translated). In 1613 a Sobor gave the country a tsar; in 1905 a Duma got the right to approve laws. In both cases the state looked for support in representation.
Views of the manifesto split from the first day: some saw the start of limits on autocracy, others thought its foundations were untouched. Peasant and worker protests went on until mid-1907, the page on the manifesto says. Its direct results were legal parties, trade unions and a legal opposition press.
I am not alone in linking the two crises. In the same review Perrie sets out the position of the American scholar Paul Avrich. He held that the revolutions of the early 20th century resemble the revolts of the early modern period. For Avrich, these were spontaneous outbursts of mass discontent, aimed both at the state and at the rich and powerful.
Perrie ends her review with a thought about the debates among scholars. They help explain the nature of Russia’s “troubles” in both the early 17th and the early 20th century. For me, the outcome of that crisis was the Manifesto of 17 October. It was the first attempt to move absolute monarchy onto the track of Duma constitutionalism. This analysis does not go beyond 1907.
What follows: three conditions that turn a crisis into a time of troubles
In the cases reviewed here, a crisis turned into a collapse of power when all three of these conditions came together:
- A dispute over the legitimacy of supreme power: in 1598–1605 an elected tsar with no blood tie to the Rurik line held the throne.
- A shock that hits bread or the treasury for at least two years in a row: the famine of 1601–1603.
- A second center of power or a claimant with the “right” name: the pretender of 1604–1605.
In 1705 there was a tax shock and a local council in Astrakhan, but, by the library note, no dispute over the tsar’s right. The revolt was put down in less than 8 months. In 1605 all three conditions met, and until the Sobor of 1613 open civil war went on for 8 years. Separate fighting, such as the Zarutsky episode, dragged on until 1614. The whole Troubles, counted from the end of the dynasty, took 15 years.
This is a scheme I built for this analysis from the facts in the sources, not a ready-made law of history. My study does not contain it in this form. Its threshold is simple. One or two conditions make a crisis, not yet a time of troubles; with all three, the state loses not its people but its foundation.
The likeness between eras lies in structure, not in numbers, and each of the three conditions can be checked against documents. That is why my study begins with the pattern itself. In Russian history, events separated by exactly one, two or three centuries sometimes show a striking structural similarity. More stories about the past and what it teaches are in our Retrospectives.


